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No Funding For Uncomfortable Results

No Funding For Uncomfortable Results

In 1997, Latanya Sweeney dramatically demonstrated that supposedly anonymized data was not anonymous. The state of Massachusetts had released data on 135,000 state employees and their families with obvious identifiers removed. However, the data contained zip code, birth date, and sex for each individual. Sweeney was able to cross-reference this data with publicly available voter registration data to find the medical records of then-Massachusetts Gov. William Weld.

no funding
Latanya Sweeney takes part in a panel discussion at a Knight News Challenge event at the Paley Center for Media in New York City on Nov. 16, 2017. Photo: Parker Higgins/Wiki Commons

An estimated 87 percent of Americans can be identified by the combination of zip code, birth date, and sex. A back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that this should not be surprising, but Sweeney appears to be the first to do this calculation and pursue the results. (See such a calculation in the next post.)

In her paper, “Only You, Your Doctor, and Many Others May Know,” Sweeney says that her research was unwelcome. More than 20 journals turned down her paper on the Weld study, and nobody wanted to fund privacy research that might reach uncomfortable conclusions.

A decade ago, funding sources refused to fund re-identification experiments unless there was a promise that results would likely show that no risk existed or that all problems could be solved by some promising new theoretical technology under development. Financial resources were unavailable to support rigorous scientific studies otherwise.”

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There’s a perennial debate over whether it is best to make security and privacy flaws public or to suppress them. The consensus, as much as there is a consensus, is that one should reveal flaws discreetly at first and then err on the side of openness. For example, a security researcher finding a vulnerability in Windows would notify Microsoft first and give the company a chance to fix the problem before announcing the vulnerability publicly. In Sweeney’s case, however, there was no single responsible party who could quietly fix the world’s privacy vulnerabilities. Calling attention to the problem was the only way to make things better.

Latanya Sweeney is professor of government and technology in residence at Harvard University, director of the Data Privacy Lab at Harvard, Editor-in-Chief of Technology Science, and was formerly the Chief Technology Officer of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission. She earned her Ph.D. in computer science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and her undergraduate degree from Harvard. More information about Dr. Sweeney is available at her website at latanyasweeney.org

This article was originally published on the JohnDCook.com blog. It is resposted here with the permission of the author, John D. Cook. Read more here on data privacy consulting.